Shared intention and personal intentions

Bratman, M. (1987). Intentions, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bratman, M. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. Philosophical Review, 101, 327–340.

Bratman, M. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104, 97–113.

Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feinberg, J. (1970). The nature and value of rights. Journal of Value Inquiry, 4, 243–257.

Gilbert, M. (1987). Modeling collective belief. Synthese, 73, 185–204. Reprinted in Gilbert (1996).

Gilbert, M. (1989). On social facts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Gilbert, M. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25, 1–14. (Reprinted in Gilbert (1996)).

Gilbert, M. (1996). Living together: Rationality, sociality, and obligation. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefleld.

Gilbert, M. (1997). What is it for Us to Intend? In G. Holmstrom-Hintikka & R. Tuomela (Eds.), Contemporary action theory, (Vol. 2, pp. 65–85). Dordrecht. (Reprinted in Gilbert (2000)).

Gilbert, M. (1998). In search of sociality: Recent developments in the philosophy of social phenomena. Philosophical Explorations, 1, 233–241. (Reprinted in Gilbert (2000)).

Gilbert, M. (2000). Sociality and responsibility: New essays in plural subject theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Gilbert, M. (2002a). Belief and acceptance as features of groups. Protosociology, 16, 35–69.

Gilbert, M. (2002b). Collective wrongdoing: Moral and legal responses. Social Theory and Practice, 28, 167–187.

Gilbert, M. (2003). The structure of the social atom: Joint commitment as the foundation of human social behavior. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing metaphysics (pp. 39–64). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Gilbert, M. (2004). Scanlon on promissory obligation: The problem of promisees’ rights. Journal of Philosophy, 101, 83–109.

Gilbert, M. (2006). A theory of political obligation: Membership, commitment, and the bonds of society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gilbert, M. (2007). Searle and collective intentions. In S. Tsohatzidis (Ed.), Intentional acts and institutional facts. Dordrecht: Springer.

Gilbert, M. (2008). Social convention revisited. Topoi, 27, 5–16.

Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review, 64, 175–191.

Roth, A. S. (2004). Shared agency and contralateral commitments. Philosophical Review, 113, 359–410.

Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Searle, J. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, & M. E. Pollack (Eds.), Intentions in communication (pp. 401–415). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sellars, W. (1963). Imperatives, intentions, and the logic of ‘Ought’. In G. Nakhnikian & H.-N. Castaneda (Eds.), Morality and the language of conduct (pp. 159–218). Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Tuomela, R., & Miller, K. (1988). We-Intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53, 367–389.

Velleman, D. (1997). How to share an intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 29–50.

Verbeek, B. (2007). Rational self-commitment. In F. Peter & H.-B. Schmid (Eds.), Rationality and commitment. Oxford: Oxford Universty Press.