Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience

Bermúdez, J. L. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Bitbol, M. and Luisi, P.L. 2005. Autopoiesis with or without cognition: Defining life at its edge. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 1: 99–107.

Block, N. 1997. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (pp. 375–416). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/A Bradford Book.

Bourgine, P. and Stewart, J. 2004. Autopoiesis and cognition. Artificial Life 20: 327–345.

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

Church, J. 1997. Fallacies or analyses? In N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (pp. 425–426). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/A Bradford Book.

Crick, F. 1994. The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Scribners.

Derryberry, D. and Tucker, D. M. 1994. Motivating the focus of attention. In P.M. Niedenthal and S. Kitayama (eds.), The Heart's Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception and Attention, (pp. 167–196). New York: Academic Press.

Di Paolo, E. 2005. Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, this volume.

Gallagher, S. 1986a. Lived body and environment. Research in Phenomenology 16: 139–170.

Gallagher, S. 1986b. Body image and body schema: A conceptual clarification. The Journal of Mind and Behavior 7: 541–554.

Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object perception. Theoria et Historia Scientarium: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies 7: 53–68.

Gibson, J.J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Hanna, R. and Thompson, E. 2003. The mind-body-body problem. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies 7.

Humphrey, N. 2000. How to solve the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4: 5–20.

Hurley, S.L. 1998. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hurley, S.L. and Noë, A. 2003. Neural plasticity and consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18: 131–168.

Husserl, E. 1960. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. Dorian Cairns. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenological Philosophy and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. Trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. 2001. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Trans. A.J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Kriegel, U. 2003a. Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2: 1–26.

Kriegel, U. 2003b. Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33: 103–132.

LeDoux, J. 2002. Synaptic Self. How Our Brains Become Who We Are. London: Penguin Books.

Legrand, D. 2003. How not to find the neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12: 544–546.

Legrand, D. (in press). The bodily self: the sensori-motor roots of pre-reflexive selfconsciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Maturana, H.R. 1969. The neurophysiology of cognition. In P. Garvin (ed.), Cognition: A Multiple View, pp. 3–23. New York: Spartan Books.

Maturana, H.R. 1970. Biology of cognition. In H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, (pp. 2–58). Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume 43. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 42. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. 1987. The Tree of Knowledge. The Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Boston: Shambala Press/New Science Library.

Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans Colin Smith. London: Routledge Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964. Signs. Trans. Richard C. McCleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Myin, E. and O'Regan, J.K. 2002. Perceptual consciousness, access to modality, and skill theories: A way to naturalize phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9: 27–46.

Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83: 435–450.

Noë, A. 2002. Is perspectival self-consciousness non-conceptual? Philosophical Quarterly 52: 185–195.

Noë, A. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Noë, A. and Thompson, E. 2004a. Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 3–28.

Noë, A. and Thompson, E. 2004b. Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness. Authors' Reply to commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 87–98.

O'Regan, J.K. and Noë, A. 2001a. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 939–1011.

O'Regan, J.K. and Noë, A. 2001b. Authors' response: Acting out our sensory experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 1011–1031.

O'Regan, J.K., Myin, E. and Noë, A. 2005. Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alerting capacity’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, this volume.

Priest, S. 1998. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge Press.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. 1999. The Primacy of Movement. Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Press.

Shoemaker, S. 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65: 55–567.

Shoemaker, S. 1984. Identity, Cause and Mind. Philosophical Essays. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, E. 2001. Empathy and consciousness. In E. Thompson (ed.), Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness, Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic. Also published in Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 1–32.

Thompson, E. 2004. Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 381–398.

Thompson, E. 2005. Empathy and human experience. In J.D. Proctor (ed.), Science, Religion, and the Human Experience. New York: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, E. and Varela, F.J. 2001. Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5: 418–425.

Thompson, E., Palacios, A., and Varela, F.J. 1992. Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 1–74. Reprinted in Alva Noë and Evan Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002.

Varela, F.J. 1979. Principles of Biological Autonomy. New York: Elsevier North Holland.

Varela, F.J. 1991. Organism: A meshwork of selfless selves. In A. Tauber (ed.), Organism and the Origin of Self (pp. 79–107). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Varela, F.J. 1997. Patterns of life: Intertwining identity and cognition. Brain and Cognition 34: 72–87.

Varela, F.J. and Bourgine, P. (eds.) 1991. Toward a Practice of Autonomous Systems. Proceedings of the First European Conference on Artificial Life (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Varela, F.J. and Thompson, E. 2003. Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspective. In A. Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

von Uexk!üll, J. 1957. A stroll through the worlds of animals and men. In K.S. Lashley (ed.), Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept (pp. 5–80). New York: International Universities Press.

Zahavi, D. 1999. Self-Awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Zahavi, D. 2002. First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 7–26.

Zahavi, D. 2003. Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zahavi, D. 2004. Intentionality and phenomenality: A phenomenological take on the hard problem. In E. Thompson (ed.), The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume.