SOX generated changes in board composition: Has accounting's academia noticed?
Tóm tắt
This paper surveys the academic accounting papers published to-date concerning the effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and associated stock exchange requirement changes for publicly listed firm's boards of director's composition and structure. Professionals in for-profit organisations will see what changes appear to have delivered market value improvements, for example, from adding an audit committee financial expert with an accounting background, to avoiding staggered board elections. Nonprofit professionals will get exposed to some of the audit committee trends in the not-for-profit domain. Academic readers will learn of the many important research opportunities that remain available in the wake of this major regulatory legislation. Anyone, whether academic or professional, concerned with the overall governance of commercial or nonprofit organisations will learn things of value from this paper and will get exposed to thought-provoking ideas of potential value in the future. This paper was deeply researched, from over 40 books and articles prior to SOX, to provide relevant historical background as to how the many new, board of director structure and composition change requirements became part of the US Congress's, the SEC's and the stock exchanges' answers for the numerous financial reporting scandals that plagued the start of the millennium.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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This decades-old NYSE audit committee listing requirement and SEC recommendation was only recently enacted into federal law as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, herein after SOX.
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Compensation committee Interlocking relationships exists when the CEO of company A sits on the compensation committee of company B and the CEO of company B sits on the compensation committee of company A. Such a relationship sets up a temptation to help one-another as opposed to the stockholders.
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Both articles were submitted for publication prior to Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002 becoming law.
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Endogenous here means ‘originated within the firm.’ Such an internal decision raises a concern that this decision is made at the same time as many other internal decisions; therefore who is to say if one causes the other or both are caused in reaction to some other internal (endogenous) or external (exogenous) factor.
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The topics of interest for these 11 are presented in Table 2.
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