Resource Distribution in Multiple Attacks with Imperfect Detection of the Attack Outcome

Risk Analysis - Tập 32 Số 2 - Trang 304-318 - 2012
Gregory Levitin1,2, Kjell Hausken3
1Collaborative Autonomic Computing Laboratory, School of Computer Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
2The Israel Electric Corporation Ltd., Haifa 31000, Israel.
3Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway

Tóm tắt

This article extends the previous research of consecutive attacks strategy by assuming that an attacker observes the outcome of each attack imperfectly. With given probabilities it may wrongly identify a destroyed target as undestroyed, and wrongly identify an undestroyed target as destroyed. The outcome of each attack is determined by a contest success function that depends on the amount of resources allocated by the defender and the attacker to each attack. The article suggests a probabilistic model of the multiple attacks and analyzes how the target destruction probability and the attacker's relative resource expenditure are impacted by the two probabilities of incorrect observation, the attacker's and defender's resource ratio, the contest intensity, the number of attacks, and the resource distribution across attacks. We analyze how the attacker chooses the number of attacks, the attack stopping rule, and the optimal resource distribution across attacks to maximize its utility.

Từ khóa


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Thông tin xuất bản

Risk Analysis

Tập 32 Số 2

304-318

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