Reputation and imperfect information

Journal of Economic Theory - Tập 27 Số 2 - Trang 253-279 - 1982
David M. Kreps1, Robert Wilson1
1Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305 USA

Tóm tắt

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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