Rent-seeking versus productive activities in a multi-task experiment

European Economic Review - Tập 55 - Trang 630-643 - 2011
Hessel Oosterbeek1, Randolph Sloof1, Joep Sonnemans1
1University of Amsterdam, School of Economics, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Tài liệu tham khảo

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