Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Cơ chế phân bổ người tị nạn: lý thuyết và ứng dụng cho Liên minh châu Âu
Tóm tắt
Chúng tôi nghiên cứu một vấn đề di dời liên quan đến việc phân bổ một số lượng người tị nạn nhất định—những người có sự khác biệt về quốc gia xuất xứ và các đặc điểm như giới tính, độ tuổi hoặc trình độ học vấn—từ Hy Lạp sang các quốc gia khác trong Liên minh châu Âu, những quốc gia đã cam kết tiếp nhận một số lượng người tị nạn nhất định. Để nghiên cứu vấn đề này, chúng tôi đã phát triển một khung khái niệm bao gồm ba phương pháp phân bổ: phân bổ nguồn lực đa tác nhân theo trình tự, phân bổ đồng thời, và phân bổ hai giai đoạn. Trong các phương pháp này, chúng tôi kết hợp các sở thích bằng cách giả định rằng các quốc gia đích có những sở thích riêng về các đặc điểm của người tị nạn, nhưng họ cũng cố gắng xem xét các sở thích của người tị nạn về các quốc gia đích. Mặc dù các phương pháp này khác nhau về thiết kế và thực hiện, cả ba đều nhằm tạo ra một phương pháp phân bổ công bằng hơn cho cả người tị nạn và các quốc gia đích. Các phương pháp này cũng có thể được áp dụng cho những vấn đề phân bổ tương tự khác.
Từ khóa
#phân bổ người tị nạn #phương pháp phân bổ #Liên minh châu Âu #di dời #sở thích người tị nạnTài liệu tham khảo
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