Rearming the Slingshot?

Meg Wallace1
1University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA

Tóm tắt

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

Barwise, & Perry. (1983). Situations and attitudes. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Church, A. (1943). Review of Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics”. Philosophical Review, 52, 298–304.

Cummins, & Gottlieb. (1972). On an argument for truth-functionality. American Philosophical Quarterly, 9(3), 265–269.

Davidson, D. (1969). True to the facts’ in his inquiries into truth and interpretation (pp. 37–54). Oxford: Clarendon.

Donnellan, K. (1966). Reference and definite descriptions. The Philosophical Review, 77(1966), 281–304.

Kaplan, David (1978) ‘Dthat’ Pragmatics, Syntax, and Semantics, vol. 9., ed. P. Cole (New York: Academic Press.

King, J. (2001). Complex demonstratives: a quantificational account, 2001. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Kripke, S. (1977). Speaker’s reference and semantic Reference’. Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2, 255–276.

Lycan. (1974). The extensionality of cause, space and time. Mind, 83, 498–511.

McGinn, C. (1976). A note on the Frege argument. Mind, 83, 422–423.

Neale, S. (1990) Descriptions. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Neale, S. (1995). The philosophical significance of Gödel’s slingshot. Mind, 104(416), 761–825.

Neale, S. (2001). Facing facts. Oxford: University Press.

Oppy, G. (1997). The philosophical insignificance of Godel’s slingshot. Mind, 106, 121–141.

Oppy, G. (2004). ‘Facing Facts?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(4), 621–643.

Quine, W. V. O. (1953). ‘On What There Is’ in his from a logical point of view. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Russell, Bertrand (1919) ‘Descriptions’ Introduction to mathematical philosophy