Rational normative economics vs ‘social welfare’ and ‘social choice’

European Economic Review - Tập 38 - Trang 721-730 - 1994
Serge-Christophe Kolm1
1Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 54 blvd Raspail, 75006 Paris, France

Tài liệu tham khảo

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