Rational lobbying and EU climate policy
Tóm tắt
Using a simple rational choice model as a heuristic device, this paper explores the lobbying behaviour of environmental and business organisations in the field of climate policy and discusses why their lobbying behaviour differs. I find that environmental organisations lobby less than what would be considered rational according to the simple rational choice model, and argue that this might largely be explained by tight budget constraints. I also find that business organisations lobby more than what would be considered rational according to the model, and argue that this might be explained if one applies a long-term perspective on rational lobbying in the policy field rather than a short-term perspective on single policy decisions. Moreover, I find that the type of lobbying differs. While environmental organisations focus on single policy decisions, business organisations also invest in general lobbying. The analysis is based on interviews with interest organisations lobbying in the field of climate policy at the European Union (EU) level.
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Tài liệu tham khảo
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