Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups

Ethology and Sociobiology - Tập 13 - Trang 171-195 - 1992
Robert Boyd1, Peter J. Richerson1
1Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

Tài liệu tham khảo

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