Profitability of corporate social responsibility in network industries

Luciano Fanti1, Domenico Buccella2
1Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Via Cosimo Ridolfi, 10, 56124, Pisa, PI, Italy
2Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Jagiellońska Street, 57/59, 03301 Warsaw, Poland

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