Private Investment, Public Aid and Endogenous Divergence in the Evolution of Urban Neighborhoods
Tóm tắt
This paper offers a novel explanation for urban blight and endogenous divergence in the overall quality and wealth of neighborhoods and simultaneously derives the salient features of actual urban renewal and other aid programs from optimizing government behavior based on collective public preferences. These features appear when the objective of such public aid programs is to restore the ex ante distribution of wealth or property values within a blighted neighborhood, while equilibria exhibiting deficient levels of private investment and blight itself can arise when residents accurately anticipate the potential provision of public aid to an affected neighborhood and ex ante investment in private insurance diminishes neighborhood eligibility for such aid. Examples of antipodal equilibria in which urban renewal programs entirely crowd out local private investment or in which neighborhood residents invest in efficient levels of private mitigation illustrate these results, which stand in direct contrast to both traditional explanations of urban blight and to the new “social-interaction” models of neighborhood divergence.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Aaron, H., and G. von Furstenberg. (1971). “The Inefficiency of Transfers in Kind: The Case of Housing Assistance,” Western Economic Journal 9, 184–191.
Benabou, R. (1993). “Workings of a City: Location, Education and Production,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 619–652.
Browne, M., and R. Hoyt. (1998). “The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence,” Working Paper, School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Cabrales, A., Calvo-Armengol, and M. Jackson. (2003). “ ‘La Crema:’ A Case Study of Mutual Fire Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy 111(2), 425–458.
Chisholm, M., and P. Kevill. (1987). “Inner City Waste Land: An Assessment of Government and Market Failure in Land Development,” Working Paper 108, Institute of Economic Affairs (London).
Crook, A. D. H., and M. Moroney. (1995). “Housing Associations, Private Finance and Risk Avoidance: The Impact on Urban Renewal and Inner Cities,” Environment and Planning 27(11), 1695–1712.
Davis, O., and A. Whinston. (1966). “The Economics of Urban Renewal.” In J. Wilson (ed.), Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, pp. 50–67.
de Bartolome, C. (1999). “Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with a Peer Group,” Journal of Political Economy 197, 110–133.
Dokko, Y., and R. Edelstein. (1992). “Towards a Real Estate Land Use Modeling Paradigm,” American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Journal 20(2), 199–209, Summer.
Durlauf, S. (1996). “Neighborhood Effects, Endogenous Stratification, and Income Inequality.” In W. Barnett, G. Gandolfo and C. Hillinger (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Economic Theory and Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Durlauf, S. (1999). “The Memberships Theory of Inequality: Ideas and Implications.” In E. Brezis and P. Temin (eds.), Elites, Minorities and Economic Growth, New York: Elsevier Science.
Durlauf, S., and H. P. Young. (2001). Social Dynamics, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
Edelstein, R. (1982). “Public Policy and Urban Property Insurance Markets.” In J. V. Henderson (ed.), Research in Urban Economics. Greenwich (CT): JAI Press.
Ehrlich, I., and G. Becker, (1972). “Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection,” Journal of Political Economy 80, 623–648.
Fagiolo, G. (2001). “Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation,” Laboratory of Economics and Management Working Paper 2001-15, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, October.
FEMA. (1997). Disaster Response and Recovery Series, Publications DR and R 2, 3, and 7, Federal Emergency Management Administration, Printing and Publication Division, Washington, D.C.
Frame, D. (1998). “Housing, Natural Hazards and Insurance,” Journal of Urban Economics 44, 93–109.
Frame, D. (2001). “Insurance and Community Welfare,” Journal of Urban Economics 49, 267–284.
Galster, G. (2002). “An Economic Efficiency Analysis of Deconcentrating Poverty Populations,” Journal of Housing Economics 11(4), 303–329, December.
Giddings, B., and K. Shaw. (2000). “Community Regeneration Projects in Britain.” In S. A. Pretoria, (ed.), Proceedings: Strategies for a Sustainable Built Environment, August.
Glaeser, E., and J. Scheinkman. (2002). “Non-Market Interactions,” Working Paper 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Green, R. K., and M. White. (1997). “Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning on Children,” Journal of Urban Economics 41, 441–461.
Grieson, R., and J. White. (1989). “The Existence and Capitalization of Neighborhood Externalities,” Journal of Urban Economics 25(1), 68–76.
Gron, A. (1994). “Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property—Casualty Insurance Markets,” Rand Journal of Economics 25, 110–127.
Haag, M., and R. Lagunoff. (1999). “Social Norms, Local Interactions and Neighborhood Planning,” Economics Department Working Paper, Georgetown University.
Hoff, K., and A. Sen. (2002). “Homeownership, Community Interactions and Segragation,” Working Paper, the World Bank, January.
HUD. (2004). HUD Community Development Programs. Washington, DC: Office of Community Planning and Development, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Ioannides, Y. (2000). “Residential Neighborhood Effects,” Economics Department Working Paper, Tufts University, December.
Kruythoff, H. (2003). “Dutch Urban Restructuring Policy in Action Against Socio-spatial Segration: Sense or Nonsense?” European Journal of Housing Policy 3(2), 193–215, August.
Kunreuther, H. (1996). “Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 12, 171–187.
Kunreuther, H., and R. Hogarth. (1992). “How Does Ambiguity Affect Insurance Decisions?” In G. Dionne (ed.), Contributions to Insurance Economics, Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security, London: Kluwer Academic Press, pp. 307–324.
Kunreuther, H., and R. Roth. (1998). Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States, Washington: National Academy Press.
Kunreuther, H., R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz. (1978). Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. New York: Wiley.
Lewis, T., and D. Nickerson. (1989). “Self-Insurance Against Natural Disasters,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16, 209–223.
Liu, F. (2004). “ ‘Interrupted Development’: The Effects of Blighted Neighborhoods, Land Use Planning and Topographic Barriers on Cities,” Economics Department Working Paper, George Washington University.
McDonald, J., and D. McMillen. (2003). “Costs and Benefits of Land Use Restrictions: A Theoretical Survey,” Journal of Real Estate Literature 11(2), 157–178.
Palm, R. (1995). Earthquake Insurance: A Longitudinal Study of California Homeowners, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.
Polinsky, M., and S. Shavell. (1976). “Amenities and Property Values in a Model of an Urban Area,” Journal of Public Economics 5, 119–129, January–February.
Rodrik, D., and R. Zeckhauser. (1988). “The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7, 601–620.
Rosen, H. (1985). “Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency and Equity.” In A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Volume I, Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.
Rothenberg, J. (1967). The Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Rothenberg, J., G. Galster, R. Butler, and J. Pitkin. (1991). The Maze of Urban Housing Markets: Theory, Evidence and Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schall, L. (1976). “Urban Renewal Policy and Economic Efficiency,” American Economic Review 66(4), 612–628, September.
Shilling, J., C. F. Sirmans, and J. Benjamin. (1989). “Flood Insurance, Wealth Redistribution and Urban Property Values,” Journal of Urban Economics 26(1), 43–53, July.
Shorrocks, A. (1983). “Ranking Income Distributions,” Economica 50, 3–17.
Slovic, P., H. Kunreuther, and F. White. (1974). “Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards.” In F. White (ed.), Natural Hazards: Local, National and Global, London: Oxford University Press.
Slovic, P., B. Fischoff, S. Lichtenstein, B. Corrigan, and B. Combs. (1977). “Preference for Insuring Against Small Losses,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 44, 237–258.
Smith, L., Rosen K., and G. Fallis. (1988). “Recent Developments in Economic Models of Housing Markets,” Journal of Economic Literature 26, 29–64.
Spivack, R. (1991). “The Determinants of Housing Maintenance and Upkeep,” Applied Economics 23, 639–646.
Stratton, R. (1989). Disaster Relief: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Syron, R. F. (1972). “The Hard Economics of Ghetto Fire Insurance,” New England Economic Review 1, 2–11, March–April.
Syron, R. F. (1973). “Administered Prices and the Market Reaction: The Case of Urban Core Property Insurance,” Journal of Finance 28(1), 147–156, March.
Teaford, J. (2000). “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath,” Housing Policy Debate 11(2), 443–465, Fall.
Walker, M. (1938). Urban Blight and Slums: Economic and Legal Factors in Their Origin, Reclamation and Prevention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Walker, G. (2000). “Urban Planning, Hazardous Installations and Blight: An Evaluation of Responses to Hazard-Development Conflict,” Enivronment and Planning 18(2), 127–143, April.
Walzer, N. (ed.), (1995). Local Economic Development: Incentives and International Trends. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Young, H. P. (1996). “The Economics of Convention,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(2), 105–122.
Young, H. P. (1998). Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton: Princeton University Press.