Post‐crisis restructuring of the corporate governance of Korean companies

Corporate Governance (Bingley) - 2013
Jin‐youngJung1
1Based at the College of Business Administration, Inha University, Incheon, South Korea

Tóm tắt

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to identify both the problems and their solutions in the corporate governance systems of Korean business groups (chaebols) in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.Design/methodology/approachThis is a conceptual paper and includes suggestions for improving international governance systems.FindingsIn this paper, the author focuses on how chaebols should be restructured to improve the Korean economy. In order to figure out how they should be restructured, the author explains the positives and negatives of their current structure and how these can be modified/eliminated to make stronger corporate governance.Originality/valueThe paper provides conceptual insights into systems and laws, which can be used to improve the corporate governance of business groups.

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Corporate Governance (Bingley)

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