Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 33 Số 4 - Trang 27-43 - 1978
Thomas Romer1, Howard L. Rosenthal1
1Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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