Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form

Mathematical Social Sciences - Tập 33 - Trang 269-276 - 1997
M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro1, Ignacio Garcı́a-Jurado2
1Department of Statistics and OR, University of Vigo, P.O. Box 874, Vigo, Spain
2Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain

Tài liệu tham khảo

P.E.M. Borm, I. Garcı́a-Jurado, R. Cao-Abad and L. Méndez-Naya, Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games, OR Spektrum 17 (1995) 235–238. D. Fudenberg, D.M. Kreps and D.K. Levine, On the robustness of equilibrium refinements, J. Econ. Theory 44 (1988) 354–380. R. Selten, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, Int. J. Game Theory 4 (1975) 25–55.