Perfect competition vs. strategic behaviour models to derive electricity prices and the influence of renewables on market power

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 38 - Trang 661-686 - 2015
Susanne Koschker1, Dominik Möst1
1Chair of Energy Economics, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany

Tóm tắt

A variety of fundamental modelling approaches exist using different competition concepts with and without strategic behaviour to derive electricity prices. To investigate the quality and practicability of these different approaches in energy economics, a perfect competition model, a Cournot model and a Bilevel model are introduced and applied to different situations in the German electricity market. The three electricity market approaches are analysed with respect to their ability to represent electricity prices and the possibility of market power abuse. Market prices are taken as a benchmark for model validity. As a result, the perfect competition model fits best to today’s market situation in most hours of the year. The Bilevel approach explains prices in high load hours sometimes better than the competition model. But complexity and calculation time increase disproportionately. In addition to the analysis of model quality, we use three scenarios to quantify how a high renewable feed-in influences the ability to abuse market power. Results show that the ability to address market power strongly depends on the amount of installed capacities.

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