Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
Tóm tắt
Necessary conditions are established for a point contained in the interior or boundary of a convex feasible subset of Euclidean space to be quasi-undominated in an anonymous simple game. Most of the conditions are behaviorally intuitive and imply pariwise symmetries among utility gradients.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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