PREDICTION MARKETS IN THE LABORATORY

Journal of Economic Surveys - Tập 27 Số 3 - Trang 589-603 - 2013
Cary Deck1, David Porter2
1University of Arkansas Chapman University
2Chapman University

Tóm tắt

AbstractPrediction markets are becoming an ever more popular method for aggregating disparate information. Companies use prediction markets to forecast sales, release dates, and other internal activities. Recently, several well‐known economists have argued that government ought to eliminate impediments to unleashing the power of prediction markets broadly. This survey paper looks at the laboratory experiments which provide part of the scientific justification for using prediction markets. These systems work because people who have private knowledge can use this “insider information” in the market, but doing so causes the price to reflect these data. Starting with early experiments that show markets can, under certain circumstances, aggregate information, we discuss the robustness of prediction markets to various design features. We also discuss places where performance does not match rhetoric and briefly look at experimental comparisons of alternative information aggregating institutions. Another issue consistently raised regarding the implementation of prediction markets is the degree to which traders can manipulate prices and thus the information gleaned. By following a series of experiments on manipulation, we present the circumstances that are and are not sufficient for manipulation attempts to be successful. Finally, we offer suggestions on where we believe future experiments are needed in this area.

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