Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 136 - Trang 559-585 - 2022
Pierfrancesco Guarino1, Gabriel Ziegler2,3
1University of Udine, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche (DIES), Via Francesco Tomadini, 30/A Udine (UD), 33100, Italy
2University of Edinburgh, School of Economics, 30 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JT, UK
3University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, 4700 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, 230 South Bouquet Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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