Optimal stealing time
Tóm tắt
We study a dynamic game in which players can steal parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The effectiveness of a player’s theft is a random function which is stochastically increasing in the share of the pie the agent currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals change with the number of players involved in the game and investigate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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