Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
Tóm tắt
This paper addresses two questions concerning Joint Venture (JV) agreements. We first study the formation and the performance of a JV when the partners’ contribution has a different impact on the JV profits. Then, we check whether the JV is more likely as well as the welfare level improves when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is delegated to an independent JV management (Management sharing) rather than jointly taken by partners (Coordinated sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV’s profits should have a larger profit share. Moreover, at least in some cases, Management sharing increases both welfare and the probability that the JV is formed.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Aloysius JA (2002) Research joint ventures: a cooperative game for competitors. Eur J Oper Res 136(3): 591–602
Al-Saadon Y, Das SP (1996) Host-country policy, transfer pricing and ownership distribution in international joint ventures: a theoretical analysis. Int J Ind Organ 14(3): 345–364
Anbarci N, Lemke R, Roy S (2002) Inter-firm complementarities in r&d: a re-examination of the relative performance of joint ventures. Int J Ind Organ 20(2): 191–213
Asiedu E, Esfahani HS (2001) Ownership structure in foreign direct investments projects. Rev Econ Stat 83(4): 647–662
Belleflamme P, Bloch F (2000) Optimal ownership structures in asymmetric joint ventures. Working Paper, no. 411. Queen Mary University of London
Caloghirou Y, Ioannides S, Vonortas NS (2003) Research joint ventures. J Econ Surv 17(4): 541–570
d’Aspremont C, Jacquemin A (1988) Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. Am Econ Rev 78(5): 1133–1137
Deringer FB (2005) Joint ventures and alliances. An introductory guide. Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer Publications, London
Goeree MS, Helland E (2008) Do research joint ventures serve a collusive function? mimeo
Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. J Polit Econ 94(4): 691–719
Hagerdoon J, Link AN, Vonortas NS (1999) Research partnerships. Res Policy 29(4–5): 567–586
Hart OD, Moore J (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm. J Polit Econ 98(6): 1119–1158
Lin P, Saggi K (2004) Ownership structure and technological upgrading in international joint ventures. Rev Dev Econ 8(2): 279–294
Makino S, Beamish PW (1998) Performance and survival of joint ventures with non-conventional ownership structures. J Int Bus Stud 29(4): 797–918
Muthoo A (2004) Bargaining theory with applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nakamura M (2005) Joint venture instability, learning and the relative bargaining power of the parent firms. Int Bus Rev 14(4): 465–493
Nakamura M, Yeung B (1994) On the determinants of foreign ownership shares: evidence from US firms joint ventures in Japan. Manag Decis Econ 15(2): 95–106
Noe TH, Rebello MJ, Shirkhande MM (2002) Structuring international cooperative ventures. Rev Financ Stud 15(4): 1251–1282
OECD (2001) Directorate for financial, fiscal and enterprise affairs comitee on competition law and policy. Competition Issues in Joint Ventures
Veugelers R, Kestelkoot K (1996) Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: is the matthew effect catalyzying. J Econ 64(1): 23–51