Optimal deterrence of nuisance suits by repeat defendants

International Review of Law and Economics - Tập 13 - Trang 135-144 - 1993
Thomas J. Miceli1
1Department of Economics, The University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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