Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders

Alexey Malakhov1, Rakesh Vohra2
1University of Arkansas
2Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA

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