One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics - Tập 9 Số 4 - Trang 1-29 - 2017
Quoc-Anh Do1, Kieu-Trang Nguyen2, Anh Tran3
1ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) (28 rue des Saints-Pères - 75007 Paris - France)
2LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science (Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE - United Kingdom)
3Indiana University (United States)

Tóm tắt

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown. (JEL D72, H76, O15, O17, O18, P25, Z13)

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