On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games
Tóm tắt
This paper reports the first cross-study competitive test of thecore solution in side-payment games where the core is nonempty and nonunique (i.e., larger than a single point). The core was tested against five alternative theories including the Shapley value, the disruption nucleolus, the nucleolus, the 2-center, and the equality solution. A generalized Euclidean distance metric which indexes the average distance between an observed payoff vector and the entire set of predicted payoff vectors (Bonacich, 1979) was used as the measure of goodness-of-fit. Analysis of data assembled from six previously reported studies (encompassing a total of 1,464 observations over 56 3-person and 4-person side-payment games) showed the core to predict less accurately than the Shapley value, disruption nucleolus, and nucleolus solutions (p < 0.01). These findings are consistent with previous empirical results that show the core to have a low level of predictive accuracy in side-payment games.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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