On the logic of “agreeing to disagree” type results

Journal of Economic Theory - Tập 51 - Trang 184-193 - 1990
Ariel Rubinstein1
1Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

Tài liệu tham khảo

Aumann, 1976, Agreeing to disagree, Ann. Statist., 4, 1236, 10.1214/aos/1176343654 Bacharach, 1982 Bacharach, 1985, Some extensions to a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge, J. Econ. Theory, 37, 167, 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90035-3 D. Brown and J. Geanakoplos, Common knowledge without partitions, unpublished. Cave, 1983, Learning to agree, Econ. Lett., 12, 147, 10.1016/0165-1765(83)90126-X Dow, 1988 Geanakoplos, 1989 Milgrom, 1982, Information, trade and common knowledge, J. Econ. Theory, 26, 17, 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1 Rubinstein, 1989, The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “Almost common knowledge,”, Amer. Econ. Rev., 79, 385 Samet, 1987, Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree Shin, 1987