On the Nature of Fair Behavior

Economic Inquiry - Tập 41 Số 1 - Trang 20-26 - 2003
Armin Falk1, Ernst Fehr2, Urs Fischbacher3,4
1Falk: Assistant Professor, University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Bluemlisalpstreasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail [email protected]
2Fehr: Professor, University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Bluemlisalpstreasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail [email protected]
3Financial Support by the Swiss National Science foundation (Project 1214-05100.97) and by the MacArthur Foundation (Natwork on Economic Environments and the Evolution of individual Preferences and Social Norms) is Gratefully Acknowledged. This paper is part of the EU_TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CTP98-0238).
4Fischbacher: University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Bluemlisalpstreasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail [email protected]

Tóm tắt

This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs.

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Economic Inquiry

Tập 41 Số 1

20-26

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