On the Nature (and Irrationality) of Non-religious Faith

Annalen der Philosophie
M Gaultier1
1University of Zurich, Philosophisches Seminar, Zürichbergstrasse 43, 8044, Zürich, Switzerland

Tóm tắt

AbstractMy main aim in this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of non-religious faith. I start by summarising several well-known arguments that belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. I then try to identify the nature of the positive cognitive attitude towards p that is involved in having faith that p. After dismissing some candidates for the role, I explore the idea that faith and hope are similar attitudes. On this basis, I then advance a new characterisation of faith. Finally, I turn to the question of the rationality of faith. I argue that faith is intrinsically irrational because it is an intrinsically incoherent propositional attitude, but that there is nonetheless a sense in which faith is neither intrinsically epistemically irrational nor intrinsically practically irrational.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

Alston, W. (1996). Belief, acceptance, and religious faith. In J. Jordan & D. Howard-Snyder (Eds.), Faith, freedom, and rationality (pp. 3–27). Rowman & Littlefield.

Alston, W. (2007). Audi on Non-Doxastic Faith. In M. Timmons, J. Greco, & A. Mele (Eds.), Rationality and the good. critical essays on the ethics and epistemology of Robert Audi (pp. 123–139). Oxford University Press.

Audi, R. (2008). Belief, faith and acceptance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 63, 87–102.

Blöser, C. (2019). Hope as an irreducible concept. Ratio, 32, 205–214.

Buchak, L. (2014). Rational faith and justified belief. In L. Callahan & T. O’Connor (Eds.), Religious faith and intellectual virtue (pp. 49–72). Oxford University Press.

Buchak, L. (2017). Reason and faith. In W. J. Abraham & F. D. Aquino (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the epistemology of theology (pp. 46–63). Oxford University Press.

Cohen, J. (1992). An essay on belief and acceptance. Oxford University Press.

Han-Pile, B. (2017). Hope, powerlessness and agency. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 41, 175–201.

Howard-Snyder, D. (2013a). Propositional faith: What it is and what it is not. American Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 357–372.

Howard-Snyder, D. (2013b). Schellenberg on propositional faith. Religious Studies, 49, 181–194.

Howard-Snyder, D. (2017a). Markan faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 81, 31–60.

Howard-Snyder, D. (2017b). The skeptical christian. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 8, 142–167.

Howard-Snyder, D. (2019). Three arguments to think that faith does not entail belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 100, 114–128.

Howard-Snyder, D., & McKaughan, D. (2022a). Theorizing about faith with Lara Buchak. Religious Studies, 58, 297–326.

Howard-Snyder, D., & McKaughan, D. (2022b). Faith and resilience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 91, 205–241.

Ichikawa, J. J. (2020). Faith and epistemology. Episteme, 17, 121–140.

Jackson, E. (2019). How belief-credence dualism explains away pragmatic encroachment. The Philosophical Quarterly, 69, 511–533.

Jackson, E. (2021). Belief, faith, and hope: on the rationality of long-term commitment. Mind, 130, 35–57.

Jackson, E. (2022a). Faith, hope, and justification. In P. Silva Jr. & L. Oliveira (Eds.), Propositional and doxastic justification. New essays on their nature and significance (pp. 201–216). Routledge.

Jackson, E. (2022b). On the independence of belief and credence. Philosophical Issues, 32, 9–31.

Jackson, E. (2023). Faithfully taking pascal’s wager. The Monist, 106, 35–45.

Kwong, J. (2022). How to theorize about hope. European Journal of Philosophy, 30, 1426–1439.

Lee, W. (2023). Belief and settledness. Inquiry, 66, 1094–1119.

Malcolm, F. (2020). The moral and evidential requirements of faith. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 12, 117–142.

Palmqvist, C.-J. (2021). Analysing hope: The live possibility account. European Journal of Philosophy, 29, 685–698.

Palmqvist, C.-J. (2022). Desiderata for rational, non-doxastic faith. Sophia, 61, 499–519.

Pojman, L. (1986). Faith without belief. Faith and Philosophy, 3, 157–176.

Schellenberg, J. L. (2005). Prolegomena to a philosophy of religion. Cornell UP.

Wedgwood, R. (2012). Outright belief. Dialectica, 66, 309–329.

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Annalen der Philosophie

Thông tin tác giả