On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 34 - Trang 342-363 - 2001
John Wooders1, Jason M. Shachat2
1Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 85721
2Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, 92093

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