On Properness and Protectiveness in Two-Person Multicriteria Games
Tóm tắt
This paper extends the concepts of proper equilibria, protective behavior and prudent behavior to multicriteria games. Three types of proper equilibria based on different types of domination are introduced. It is shown that protective behavior coincides with prudent behavior. Possible relations and existence are analyzed.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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