Official rotation and corporate innovation: Evidence from the governor rotation

China Journal of Accounting Research - Tập 13 - Trang 361-385 - 2020
Xiangyan Shi1, Danlu Bu1, Chenyu Zhang2
1School of Accounting, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China
2Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, China

Tài liệu tham khảo

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