ON SOME RECENT EXPLANATIONS OF WHY CAPITAL HIRES LABOR

Economic Inquiry - Tập 22 Số 2 - Trang 171-187 - 1984
Louis Putterman1
1*Associate Professor of Economics, Brown University. I would like to thank John Bonin, George Borts, Harvey Leibenstein, Roger McCain, Richard Nelson, Jaroslav Vanek, Oliver Williamson, Sidney Winter, and the editor, John Chant, and referees, for comments on earlier drafts, and Mrs. Marion Wathey for patient and expert typing of all version.

Tóm tắt

Conventional microeconomics contains no explanation of why capital hires labor (and not the reverse). In view of some surprisingly positive results in the theoretical analysis of worker‐run enterprise systems, recent contributions to the theory of the firm have attempted to explain the dominance of capitalist production relations in efficiency terms. The present paper critically reviews works in this area by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1975, 1980), and Jensen and Meckling (1979), and contends that a convincing efficiency argument for the general superiority of capital owners' over workers' control of enterprises still is lacking.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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Economic Inquiry

Tập 22 Số 2

171-187

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