Nonbinary social choice for economic environments

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 12 - Trang 245-254 - 1995
Donald E. Campbell1
1Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, USA

Tóm tắt

Assume a finite integer l≥2 and a social choice correspondence Φ mapping each (p, Z) into a nonempty subset Φ (p, Z) of Z, where p is a profile of individual preferences and Z is a set of outcomes of cardinality l or more. Suppose that Φ satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible alternatives, and the Pareto criterion. If the preference domain is the family of profiles of classical economic preferences over the space of allocations of public goods, then Φ is dictatorial.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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