Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 44 Số 1 - Trang 459-483 - 2021
Raffaella Coppier1, Francesca Grassetti2, Elisabetta Michetti1
1Department of Economics and Law, University of Macerata, Macerata, Italy
2Department of Mathematics, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy

Tóm tắt

AbstractIn recent years, the study of the evolution of non-compliant behaviour in public procurement has been widely developed due to the growing economic relevance of this phenomenon. When such a question is formalized in terms of a dynamical model, new insights can be pursued, related to the possible evolution from a situation with low dishonesty level to high dishonesty level or vice versa. The present model considers an evolutionary adaptation process explaining whether honest or dishonest behaviour prevails in society at any given time by assuming endogenous monitoring by the State. We will distinguish between a scenario in which firms converge to monomorphic configurations (all honest or all dishonest) and a scenario in which firms converge to polymorphic compositions (that is with coexistence of both groups), depending on the relevant parameters. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical simulations, the present work aims at explaining the effectiveness of economic policies to reduce or eliminate non-compliant behaviour. Social stigma is found to play a key role: if the “inner attitude toward honesty” of a country is not strong enough, then dishonesty cannot be ruled out. However, increasing both the fine level attached to dishonest behaviour and the monitoring effort by the State can reduce asymptotic dishonesty levels and escape form the dishonesty trap.

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