Nền tảng phi Bayes cho ước lượng thống kê, dự đoán và ví dụ về quạ

Akaike, H.: 1973, ‘Information Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle’ in B. N. Petrov and F. Csaki (eds.),2nd International Symposium on Information Theory, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, pp. 267–81. Cartwright, N.: 1983,How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Cramér, H.: 1946,Mathematical Methods of Statistics, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Earman, J.: 1992,Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge. Eells, E.: 1982,Rational Decision and Causality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Forster, M.: 1988a, ‘Confirmation of Component Causes’ in A. Fine & J Leplin (eds.)PSA 1988, Philosophy of Science Association, E. Lansing, Michigan, pp. 3–9. Forster, M.: 1988b, ‘Unification, Explanation, and the Composition of Causes in Newtonian Mechanics’,Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 19, pp. 55–101. Forster, M.: 1988c, ‘Sober's Principle of Common Cause and the Problem of Incomplete Hypotheses’,Philosophy of Science 55, 538–59. Forster, M.: 1993, ‘Progress Towards the Truth’, in preparation. Forster, M. and E. Sober: 1994, ‘How To Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions’,The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, March 1994. Giere, R.: 1991,Understanding Scientific Reasoning, Third Edition, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Orlando, Florida. Good, I. J.: 1975, ‘Comments on David Miller’,Synthese 30, 205–6. Good, I. J.: 1983,Good Thinking, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Harper, W.: 1989, ‘Consilience and Natural Kind Reasoning’, in J. R. Brown and J. Mittelstrass (eds.),An Intimate Relation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 115–52. Hempel, C.: 1945, ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’,Mind,54. Reprinted in Hempel, G.: 1965,Aspects of Scientific Explanation, The Free Press, New York. Hintikka, J. and P. Suppes (eds.): 1966,Aspects of Inductive Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, J.: 1940, ‘On Confirmation’,Journal of Symbolic Logic, 133–48. Horwich, P.: 1982,Probability and Evidence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Howson, C. and Urbach, P.: 1989,Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois. Kullback, S. and R. A., Leibler: 1951, ‘On Information and Sufficiency’,Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22, 79–86. Meyer, S. L.: 1977, ‘Urning a Resolution of Hempel's Paradox’,Philosophy of Science 44, 292–96. Miller, D.: 1975, ‘The Accuracy of Predictions’,Synthese 30, pp. 159–91. Rosenkrantz, R.: 1977,Inference, Method, and Decision, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Sakamoto, Y., M. Ishiguro, and G. Kitagawa: 1986,Akaike Information Criterion Statistics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Skyrms, B.: 1980,Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws, Yale University Press, New Haven. Sober, E.: 1988a, ‘Likelihood and Convergence’,Philosophy of Science 55, 228–37. Sober, E.: 1988b,Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference, MIT Press, Cambridge. Suppes, P.: 1966, ‘A Bayesian Approach to the Paradoxes of Confirmation’, in Hintikka and Suppes (1966), pp. 198–207. Williams, P. M.: 1980, ‘Bayesian Conditionalization and the Principle of Minimum Information’,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31, 131–44.