Negative Actions

Philosophia (United States) - Tập 37 - Trang 307-333 - 2008
Benjamin Mossel1
1Raanana, Israel

Tóm tắt

Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions. I defend the following claims:

Tài liệu tham khảo

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