Các loại tự nhiên trong triết học và khoa học sự sống: Hoàng hôn học thuật hay bình minh mới?

Miles MacLeod1, Thomas A. C. Reydon2
1College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA
2Institut für Philosophie, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany

Tóm tắt

Bài báo này, được dự kiến vừa là một tài liệu quan điểm trong cuộc tranh luận triết học về các loại tự nhiên, vừa là bài biên tập mời cho số chuyên đề này, đã tiếp nhận thách thức mà Ian Hacking đặt ra trong bài viết của ông, “Các loại tự nhiên: Hoàng hôn hồng, Tri thức học thuật.” Trong khi một cách diễn giải đơn giản của bài viết đó cho thấy rằng theo Hacking, khái niệm về các loại tự nhiên nên bị từ bỏ, cả trong triết học khoa học và trong triết học nói chung, chúng tôi cho rằng một diễn giải thay thế và ít bi quan hơn cũng có thể khả thi. Chúng tôi lập luận rằng việc từ bỏ khái niệm các loại tự nhiên sẽ là quá sớm, vì nó vẫn có thể thực hiện những công việc quan trọng. Mối quan tâm của chúng tôi là về tình hình trong (triết học của) các khoa học sự sống. Dựa trên mối quan tâm này, chúng tôi cố gắng thiết lập một chương trình nghiên cứu cho tương lai về chủ đề các loại tự nhiên trong (triết học của) các khoa học sự sống.

Từ khóa


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