Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?

Achinstein, 1974, History and philosophy of science: A reply to Cohen, 350

Ankersmit, 1983

Barnes, 1996

Barthes, 1981, The discourse of history, Comparative Criticism, 3, 7

Boyd, 1984, The current status of scientific realism, 41

Brewer, 2001, The theory-ladenness of observation and the theory-ladenness of the rest of the scientific process, Philosophy of Science, 68, 176, 10.1086/392907

Brown, 1993, A theory-laden observation can test the theory, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 555, 10.1093/bjps/44.3.555

Burian, 1977, More than a marriage of convenience: On the inextricability of history and philosophy of science, Philosophy of Science, 44, 1, 10.1086/288722

Burian, 2001, The dilemma of case studies resolved: The virtues of using case studies in the history and philosophy of science, Perspectives on Science, 9, 383, 10.1162/106361401760375794

Cantor, 1975, The Edinburgh phrenology debate: 1803–1828, Annals of Science, 32, 195, 10.1080/00033797500200251

Cantor, 1975, A critique of Shapin's social interpretation of the Edinburgh phrenology debate, Annals of Science, 32, 245, 10.1080/00033797500200271

Carr, 1991

Carrier, 1989, Circles without circularity. Testing theories by theory-laden observations, 405

Chang, 2012, Beyond case-studies: History as philosophy, 109

Christie, 1993, Aurora, Nemesis and Clio, The British Journal for the History of Science, 26, 391, 10.1017/S0007087400031435

Clark, 1995, Narratology and the history of science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 26, 1, 10.1016/0039-3681(94)00029-9

Collins, 1985

Cushing, 1994

Duhem, 1954

Feldhay, 1994, Narrative constraints on historical writing. The case of the scientific revolution, Science in Context, 7, 7, 10.1017/S0269889700001563

Feyerabend, 1975

Franklin, 1989, Can a theory-laden observation test the theory?, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40, 229, 10.1093/bjps/40.2.229

Hanson, 1958

Hardin, 1982, Defense of convergent realism, Philosophy of Science, 49, 604, 10.1086/289080

Heidelberger, 2003, Theory-ladenness and scientific instruments in experimentation, 138

Hudson, 1994, Background independence and the causation of observations, Studies in History and Philosophy of science, 25, 595, 10.1016/0039-3681(94)90049-3

Hull, 1992, Testing philosophical claims about science, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 468

Kinzel K., Pluralism in historiography. A case study of case studies, In: Sauer T. and Scholl R., (Eds.), The philosophy of historical case studies, Springer; Dordrecht, (in press).

Kitcher, 1993

Kosso, 1989, Science and objectivity, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 245, 10.2307/2027109

Kosso, 1992

Kuhn, 1962

Kuukkanen, 2012, The missing narrativist turn in the historiography of science, History and Theory, 51, 340, 10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00632.x

Ladyman, 2011, Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: The case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air, Synthese, 180, 87, 10.1007/s11229-009-9607-8

Laudan, 1981, A confutation of convergent realism, Philosophy of Science, 48, 19, 10.1086/288975

Laudan, 1989, Thoughts on HPS: 20 years later, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 20, 9, 10.1016/0039-3681(89)90030-7

Laudan, 1988

McMullin, 1974, History and philosophy of science: A marriage of convenience?, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 585

Nickles, 1986, Remarks on the use of history as evidence, Synthese, 69, 253, 10.1007/BF00413983

Nickles, 1995, Philosophy of science and history of science, Osiris, 10, 138, 10.1086/368747

Pickering, 1984

Pinch, 1986

Pitt, 2001, The dilemma of case studies: Toward a Heraclitian philosophy of science, Perspectives on Science, 9, 373, 10.1162/106361401760375785

Porter, 1986, The scientific revolution: A spoke in the wheel?, 290

Psillos, 1999

Radder, 1997, Philosophy and history of Science: Beyond the Kuhnian paradigm, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 28, 633, 10.1016/S0039-3681(97)00015-0

Ricoeur, 1980, Narrative time, Critical Inquiry, 7, 169, 10.1086/448093

Roth, 1988, Narrative explanations. The case of history, History and Theory, 27, 1, 10.2307/2504958

Schickore, 2011, More thoughts on HPS: Another 20 years later, Perspectives on Science, 19, 453, 10.1162/POSC_a_00049

Shapin, 1975, Phrenological knowledge and the social structure of early nineteenth-century Edinburgh, Annals of Science, 32, 219, 10.1080/00033797500200261

Shapin, 1992, Discipline and bounding: The history and sociology of science as seen through the externalism-internalism debate, History of Science, 30, 333, 10.1177/007327539203000401

Stanford, 2006

White, 1973

White, 1978, The historical text as a literary artifact, 41

White, 1980, The value of narrativity in the representation of reality, 1

White, 1984, The question of narrative in contemporary historical theory, 26

Worrall, 1994, How to remain reasonably optimistic: Scientific realism and the ‘Luminiferous ether’, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1, 334

Wylie, 2000, On ‘Heavily Decomposing Red Herrings’: Scientific method in archaeology and the ladening of evidence with theory, 138