Modeling criminality: the impact of emotions, norms and interaction structures

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 22 - Trang 135-160 - 2015
Roger Waldeck1,2
1Department of Logics in Uses, Social Science and Information Science, Institut Mines-Telecom, Telecom Bretagne, Technopole Brest-Iroise, Brest Cedex 3, France
2Université européenne de Bretagne, Rennes, France

Tóm tắt

Criminal behavior has been explained in the literature by rational or normative arguments. We propose a game theory framework of criminal behavior integrating both concepts. Specifically the modeling includes three factors, namely the gain from criminality, the adherence to a legal norm and social pressure from criminal peers. We show that criminality cannot be lower with increasing gain from criminality, lower adherence to the legal norm or higher social pressure from criminal peers. Finally, we observe by agent-based simulations that small local interaction structures lead to spatial segregation in criminality in the case where a polymorphic equilibrium is expected.

Tài liệu tham khảo

Beaver K, Walsh A (eds) (2011) The Ashgate Research Companion to Biosocial Theories of Crime. Ashgate research companion, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., Farnham Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76:169–217 Bourguignon F (2001) Facets of globalization. The World Bank. Chapter 10: crime as a social cost of poverty and inequality: a review focusing on developing countries. pp. 171–191. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/0-8213-4742-X Bourguignon F, Nuñez J, Sanchez F (2003) A structural model of crime and inequality in colombia. J Eur Econ Assoc 1:440–449 Brock WA, Durlauf SN (2001) Interactions-based models. In: Heckman J, Leamer E (eds) Handbook of econometrics. Elsevier. Chapter 54, pp 3297–3380 Camerer CF, Loewenstein G, Prelec D (2004) Neuroeconomics: why economics needs brains. Scand J Econ 106:555–579 Chen EY (2008) Impacts of “three strikes and you’re out” on crime trends in california and throughout the united states. J Contemp Criminal Justice 24:345–370 Christakis NA, Fowler JH (2007) The spread of obesity in a social network. New Engl J Med 357: 1866–1868. (PMID: 17978297). http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMc072478 Cohen MD, Riolo RL (2001) The role of social structure in the maintenance of cooperative regimes. Ration Soc 13:5–32 Cromby J, Brown S, Gross H, Locke A, Patterson AE (2010) Constructing crime, enacting morality: emotion, crime and anti-social behaviour in an inner-city community. Br J Criminol 50:873–895 Dawes RM, Thaler RH (1988) Anomalies: cooperation. J Econ Perspect 2:187–197 De Quervain DJF, Fischbacher U, Treyer V, Schellhammer M, Schnyder U, Buck A, Fehr E (2004) The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305: 1254–1258. http://www.sciencemag.org/content/305/5688/1254.full.pdf Epstein JM (1997) Zones of cooperation in demographic prisoner’s dilemma. Complexity 4:36–48 Eshel I, Samuelson L, Shaked A (1998) Altruists, egoists, and hooligans in a local interaction model. Am Econ Rev 88:157–179 Falk A, Fischbacher U (2002) “Crime” in the lab-detecting social interaction. Eur Econ Rev 46:859–869 Faris R, Ennett S (2012) Adolescent aggression: the role of peer group status motives, peer aggression, and group characteristics. Soc Netw 34:371–378 Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2004) Social norms and human cooperation. Trends Cogn Sci 8:185–190 Freeman RB (1999) The economics of crime. In: Ashenfelter O, Card D (eds) Handbook of labor economics. Elsevier. Chap 52, pp 3529–3571 Glaeser EL, Sacerdote B, Scheinkman JA (1996) Crime and social interactions. Q J Econ 111:507–548 Glaeser EL, Sacerdote BI, Scheinkman JA (2003) The social multiplier. J Eur Econ Assoc 1:345–353 Glaeser EL, Scheinkman J (2000) Non-market interactions. Working Paper 8053. National Bureau of Economic Research Gordon MB, Phan D, Waldeck R, Nadal JP (2005) Cooperation and free-riding with moral costs. In: Press SN (ed) International conference on cognitive economics, Sofia, 5–8 Aug 2005 Grauwin S, Goffette-Nagot F, Jensen P (2012) Dynamic models of residential segregation: an analytical solution. J Public Econ 96:124–141 Haynie DL (2001) Delinquent peers revisited: does network structure matter? Am J Soc 106:1013–1057 Hirschi T (2002) Causes of delinquency. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47:263–291 Ledyard JO (1995) Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Roth A, Kagel J (eds) A handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 111–194 Ludwig J, Duncan GJ, Hirschfield P (2001) Urban poverty and juvenile crime: evidence from a randomized housing-mobility experiment. Q J Econ 116:655–679 Mehlkop G, Graeff P (2010) Modelling a rational choice theory of criminal action: subjective expected utilities, norms, and interactions. Ration Soc 22:189–222 Nowak MA, Bonhoeffer S, May RM (1994) Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 91:4877–4881 Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359:826–829 Paternoster R (2010) How much do we really know about criminal detterence? J Criminal Law Crim 100:765–824 Rauhut H (2009) Higher punishment, less control?: experimental evidence on the inspection game. Ration Soc 21:359–392 Akers R, Jennings W (2009) Social learning theory. SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks Salazar L, Baker C, Price A, Carlin K (2003) Moving beyond the individual: examining the effects of domestic violence policies on social norms. Am J Community Psychol 32:253–264 Sampson RJ, Raudenbush SW, Earls F (1997) Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science 277:918–924 Schelling TC (1971) Dynamic models of segregation. J Math Sociol 1:143–186 Schwartz RD, Orleans S (1967) On legal sanctions. Univ Chic Law Rev 34:274–300 Short MB, Brantingham PJ, D’Orsogna MR (2010) Cooperation and punishment in an adversarial game: how defectors pave the way to a peaceful society. Phys Rev E 82:066114 Strobel A, Zimmermann J, Schmitz A, Reuter M, Lis S, Windmann S, Kirsch P (2011) Beyond revenge: neural and genetic bases of altruistic punishment. NeuroImage 54:671–680 Tsebelis G (1990) Penalty has no impact on crime: a game-theoretic analysis. Ration Soc 2(3):255–286 Tversky A, Kahneman D (1992) Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323 Ugander J, Backstrom L, Marlow C, Kleinberg J (2012) Structural diversity in social contagion. Proc Natl Acad Sci 109: 5962–5966. http://www.pnas.org/content/109/16/5962.full.pdf+html Van Winden F, Ashs E (2009) On the behavioral economis of crime. Technical Report. Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision-making, University of Amsterdam Waldeck R (2013) Segregated cooperation. J Artif Soc Soc Simul 16(4):14 Walsh A (2011) Criminology: the essentials. SAGE Publications. chapter CH 8: Biosocial Approaches Watts DJ, Dodds PS (2007) Influentials, networks, and public opinion formation. J Consum Res 34:441–458 Wenzel M (2004) The social side of sanctions: personal and social norms as moderators of deterrence. Law Human Behav 28:547–567 Yar M (2009) Neither scylla nor charybdis: Transcending the criminological dualism between rationality and the emotions. Internet J Criminol Zak PJ (2004) Neuroeconomics. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 359:1737–1748