Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment

International Journal of Industrial Organization - Tập 3 - Trang 245-253 - 1985
Chaim Fershtman1
1The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 91905 Israel

Tài liệu tham khảo

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