Manager replacement, employee protest, and corporate control

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 17 - Trang 265-294 - 2015
Bing Guo1
1Business and Administration Department, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Getafe, Spain

Tóm tắt

When faced with the replacement threat, incumbent managers look for support from employees by investing in a non-contractible employee–friendly relationship. Enjoying the relationship, employees help managers preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. When the benefits from the good employee–manager relationship are large enough to cover the loss of managerial inefficiency, shareholders prefer to share the influential power at the firm with employees.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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