Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 54 Số 1 - Trang 141-166 - 2020
John Duggan1, Jacque Gao2
1Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, New York, USA
2Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, New York, USA

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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