Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts

American Economic Review - Tập 94 Số 3 - Trang 455-483 - 2004
Gary Gorton1, Lixin Huang2
1The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19041, and NBER.
2Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, 88 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Tóm tắt

Governments can efficiently provide liquidity, as when the banking system is bailed out. We study a model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date. Agents sometimes want to sell projects. The market price of the projects sold depends on the supply of liquidity, which is determined in general equilibrium. While private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations, it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante. There is a role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

American Economic Review

Tập 94 Số 3

455-483

Thông tin tác giả