Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates

Sajid M. Chaudhry1, Stefanie Kleimeier2,3
1School of Management, Swansea University, Singleton Park, Swansea, Wales SA2 8PP, United Kingdom
2School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, Tongersestraat 53, 6211 LM, Maastricht, The Netherlands
3University of Stellenbosch Business School, Carl Cronjé Drive, Bellville 7530, Cape Town, South Africa

Tài liệu tham khảo

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