Keynes after Ramsey: In defence of a treatise on probability

Anand, 1991, The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics, Oxford Economic Papers, 43, 199, 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041994

Bateman, 1987, Keynes's Changing Conception of Probability, Economics and Philosophy, 3, 97, 10.1017/S0266267100002753

Bateman, 1990, The Elusive Logical Relation, 73

Bateman, 1991, Das Maynard Keynes Problem, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 15, 101, 10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035153

Benenson, 1984

Bewley, 1986

Brady, 1989, Dynamics of Choice Behaviour: The Logical Relation Between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability, Psychological Reports, 64, 91, 10.2466/pr0.1989.64.1.91

Brady, 1989, Is there an Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox? A Note on Its Resolution, Psychological Reports, 64, 1087, 10.2466/pr0.1989.64.3c.1087

Carabelli, 1988

Cohen, 1977

Cohen, 1985, Twelve Questions about Keynes's Concept of Weight, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37, 263, 10.1093/bjps/37.3.263

Cohen, 1989

Cottrell, 1993, Keynes's Theory of Probability and its Relevance to his Economics: Three Theses, Economics and Philosophy, 9, 25, 10.1017/S0266267100005101

Curley, 1989, An Empirical Evaluation of Descriptive Models of Ambiguity Reactions in Choice Situations, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 33, 397, 10.1016/0022-2496(89)90019-9

Davis, J.B. (forthcoming), Keynes's Philosophical Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Fine, 1973

Gar̈denfors, 1988, Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking and Decision Making, 313

Gilboa, 1989, Maximin Expected Utility with a Non-unique Prior, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141, 10.1016/0304-4068(89)90018-9

Gillies, 1973

Gillies, 1988, Keynes as a Methodologist, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, 117, 10.1093/bjps/39.1.117

Gillies, 1991, Intersubjective Probability and Confirmation Theory, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42, 513, 10.1093/bjps/42.4.513

Good, 1950

Good, 1962, Subjective Probability as the Measure of a Non-Measurable Set, 319

Hicks, 1979

Jeffreys, 1961

Keynes, 1971

Keynes, 1972, X

Keynes, 1973, VII

Keynes, 1973, VIII

Keynes, 1973, XIV

Keynes, 1979, XXIX

Koopman, 1940, The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability, Annals of Mathematics, 41, 269, 10.2307/1969003

Kyburg, 1988, Bets and Beliefs, 101

Lawson, 1985, Uncertainty and Economic Analysis, Economic Journal, 95, 909, 10.2307/2233256

Lawson, 1987, The Relative/Absolute Nature of Economic Knowledge, Economic Journal, 97, 951, 10.2307/2233082

Lawson, 1991, Keynes and the Analysis of Rational Behaviour, 184

Lawson, 1992

Lawson, 1994, Review of Social Economy

Levi, 1984, Truth, Fallibility and the Growth of Knowledge, 109

Levi, 1986

Levi, 1986, The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg, Economics and Philosophy, 2, 23, 10.1017/S026626710000078X

Mellor, 1983, The Eponymous F.P. Ramsey, Journal of Graph Theory, 7, 9, 10.1002/jgt.3190070103

O'Donnell, 1989

O'Donnell, 1990, Continuity in Keynes's Conception of Probability, 53

O'Donnell, 1991, Keynes's Weight of Argument and its Bearing on Rationality and Uncertainty, 69

Ramsey, 1988, Truth and Probability, 19

Ramsey, 1989, Mr Keynes on Probability, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40, 219, 10.1093/bjps/40.2.219

Runde, 1990, Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments, Economics and Philosophy, 6, 275, 10.1017/S0266267100001255

Runde, 1991, Keynesian Uncertainty and the Instability of Beliefs, Review of Political Economy, 3, 125, 10.1080/09538259100000039

Runde, 1994, Cambridge Journal of Economics

Runde, 1994, Critical Review

Sahlin, 1990

Skidelsky, 1992

Sugden, 1991, Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy, Economic Journal, 101, 751, 10.2307/2233854

Winslow, 1986, “Human Logic” and Keynes's Economics, Eastern Economic Journal, 12, 413

Winslow, 1989, Organic Interdependence, Uncertainty and Economic Analysis, Economic Journal, 99, 1173, 10.2307/2234095