Introduction to the special issue in honor of John H. Kagel

A. Barański1, David J. Cooper2, Guillaume Fréchette3
1Division of Social Science and Center for Behavioral Institutional Design, New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
2Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA
3Department of Economics,New York University,New York,USA.

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Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., & MacDonald, D. N. (1985). Animals’ choices over uncertain outcomes: Some initial experimental results. The American Economic Review, 75(4), 597–613.

Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1981). Commodity-choice behavior with pigeons as subjects. Journal of Political Economy, 89(1), 67–91.

Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., Winkler, R. C., Fisher, E. B., Jr., Basmann, R. L., & Krasner, L. (1973). A test of consumer demand theory using observations of individual consumer purchases. Economic Inquiry, 11(4), 411–428.

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Bowen, T. R., Chen, Y., & Eraslan, H. (2014). Mandatory versus discretionary spending: The status quo effect. American Economic Review, 104(10), 2941–2974.

Bradfield, A. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2015). Legislative bargaining with teams. Games and Economic Behavior, 93, 117–127.

Casari, M., Ham, J. C., & Kagel, J. H. (2007). Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments. American Economic Review, 97(4), 1278–1304.

Che, Y.-K., Gale, I., & Kim, J. (2013). Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents. Review of Economic Studies, 80(1), 73–107.

Christiansen, N., Georganas, S., & Kagel, J. H. (2014). Coalition formation in a legislative voting game. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1), 182–204.

Christiansen, N., & Kagel, J. H. (2019). Reference point effects in legislative bargaining: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 22, 735–752.

Cooper, D. J., Garvin, S., & Kagel, J. H. (1997). Adaptive learning vs equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game. The Economic Journal, 107(442), 553–575.

Cooper, D. J., Garvin, S., & Kagel, J. H. (1997). Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game. The RAND Journal of Economics, 28, 662–683.

Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2003). Lessons learned: Generalizing learning across games. American Economic Review, 93(2), 202–207.

Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2005). Are two heads better than one? team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95(3), 477–509.

Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2008). Learning and transfer in signaling games. Economic Theory, 34(3), 415–439.

Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2009). The role of context and team play in cross-game learning. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(5), 1101–1139.

Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. H., Lo, W., & Gu, Q. L. (1999). Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers. American Economic Review, 89(4), 781–804.

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Dianat, A., & Freer, M. (2023). Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0

Duffy, J., & Kim, S. (2023). Public good bargaining under mandatory and discretionary rules: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics.

Dyer, D., Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1989). A comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: A laboratory analysis. The Economic Journal, 99(394), 108–115.

Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005). Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers. Econometrica, 73(6), 1893–1937.

Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005). Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining. Journal of Public Economics, 89(8), 1497–1517.

Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Lehrer, S. F. (2003). Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 221–232.

Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005c). Gamson’s law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2), 365–390.

Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2012). Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework. Economic Theory, 49(3), 779–800.

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Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1009–1055.

Huang, J., Kessler, J. B., & Niederle, M. (2023). Fairness has less impact when agents are less informed. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09795-w

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Kagel, J. H., Harstad, R. M., & Levin, D. (1987). Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica, 55(6), 1275–1304.

Kagel, J. H., Kim, C., & Moser, D. (1996). Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs. Games and Economic Behavior, 13(1), 100–110.

Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986). The winner’s curse and public information in common value auctions. The American Economic Review, 76(5), 894–920.

Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (2009). The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions. Princeton University Press.

Kagel, J. H., & Richard, J.-F. (2001). Super-experienced bidders in first-price common-value auctions: Rules of thumb, nash equilibrium bidding, and the winner’s curse. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(3), 408–419.

Kamm, A., & Siegenthaler, S. (2022). Commitment timing in coalitional bargaining. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09778-3

Mitzkewitz, M., & Nagel, R. (1993). Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171–198.

Rachlin, H., Kagel, J. H., & Battalio, R. C. (1980). Substitutability in time allocation. Psychological Review, 87(4), 355.

Struwe, N., Blanco, E., & Walker, J. M. (2022). Competition among public good providers for donor rewards. Experimental Economics.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09766-7

Van Essen, M., & Walker, M. (2017). A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 101, 6–19.