Introduction to the special issue in honor of John H. Kagel
Tóm tắt
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Alberti, F., & Mantilla, C. (2023). A mechanism requesting prices and quantities may increase the provision of heterogeneous public goods. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09806-w
Arad, A., Grubiak, K. P., & Penczynski, S. P. (2022). Does communicating within a team influence individuals’ reasoning and decisions? Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09786-3
Armantier, O., & Holt, C. A. (2023). Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6
Baranski, A., & Cox, C. A. (2023). Communication in multilateral bargaining with joint production. Experimental Economics, 26(1), 55–77.
Baranski, A., & Kagel, J. H. (2015). Communication in legislative bargaining. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 59–71.
Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181–1206.
Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., & MacDonald, D. N. (1985). Animals’ choices over uncertain outcomes: Some initial experimental results. The American Economic Review, 75(4), 597–613.
Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1981). Commodity-choice behavior with pigeons as subjects. Journal of Political Economy, 89(1), 67–91.
Battalio, R. C., Kagel, J. H., Winkler, R. C., Fisher, E. B., Jr., Basmann, R. L., & Krasner, L. (1973). A test of consumer demand theory using observations of individual consumer purchases. Economic Inquiry, 11(4), 411–428.
Bazerman, M. H., & Samuelson, W. F. (1983). I won the auction but don’t want the prize. Journal of conflict resolution, 27(4), 618–634.
Benoit, J.-P., & Krishna, V. (2001). Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders. The Review of Economic Studies, 68(1), 155–179.
Bergmann, U., & Konovalov, A. (2023). Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09812-y
Bowen, T. R., Chen, Y., & Eraslan, H. (2014). Mandatory versus discretionary spending: The status quo effect. American Economic Review, 104(10), 2941–2974.
Bradfield, A. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2015). Legislative bargaining with teams. Games and Economic Behavior, 93, 117–127.
Casari, M., Ham, J. C., & Kagel, J. H. (2007). Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments. American Economic Review, 97(4), 1278–1304.
Che, Y.-K., Gale, I., & Kim, J. (2013). Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents. Review of Economic Studies, 80(1), 73–107.
Christiansen, N., Georganas, S., & Kagel, J. H. (2014). Coalition formation in a legislative voting game. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(1), 182–204.
Christiansen, N., & Kagel, J. H. (2019). Reference point effects in legislative bargaining: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 22, 735–752.
Cooper, D. J., Garvin, S., & Kagel, J. H. (1997). Adaptive learning vs equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game. The Economic Journal, 107(442), 553–575.
Cooper, D. J., Garvin, S., & Kagel, J. H. (1997). Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game. The RAND Journal of Economics, 28, 662–683.
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2003). Lessons learned: Generalizing learning across games. American Economic Review, 93(2), 202–207.
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2005). Are two heads better than one? team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95(3), 477–509.
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2008). Learning and transfer in signaling games. Economic Theory, 34(3), 415–439.
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2009). The role of context and team play in cross-game learning. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(5), 1101–1139.
Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. H., Lo, W., & Gu, Q. L. (1999). Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers. American Economic Review, 89(4), 781–804.
Cox, J. C., Roberson, B., & Smith, V. L. (1982). Theory and behavior of single object auctions. Research in Experimental Economics, 2(1), 1–43.
Dianat, A., & Freer, M. (2023). Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0
Duffy, J., & Kim, S. (2023). Public good bargaining under mandatory and discretionary rules: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics.
Dyer, D., Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1989). A comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: A laboratory analysis. The Economic Journal, 99(394), 108–115.
Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005). Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers. Econometrica, 73(6), 1893–1937.
Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005). Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining. Journal of Public Economics, 89(8), 1497–1517.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Lehrer, S. F. (2003). Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 221–232.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2005c). Gamson’s law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2), 365–390.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Morelli, M. (2012). Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework. Economic Theory, 49(3), 779–800.
Gamson, W. A. (1961). A theory of coalition formation (pp. 373–382). American Sociological EReview.
Giebe, T., Ivanova-Stenzel, R., Kocher, M. G., & Schudy, S. (2023). Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8
Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1009–1055.
Huang, J., Kessler, J. B., & Niederle, M. (2023). Fairness has less impact when agents are less informed. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09795-w
Jackson, M. O., & Moselle, B. (2002). Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 49–87.
Kagel, J. H. (1995). Cross-game learning: Experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions. Economics Letters, 49(2), 163–170.
Kagel, J. H., Harstad, R. M., & Levin, D. (1987). Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica, 55(6), 1275–1304.
Kagel, J. H., Kim, C., & Moser, D. (1996). Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs. Games and Economic Behavior, 13(1), 100–110.
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986). The winner’s curse and public information in common value auctions. The American Economic Review, 76(5), 894–920.
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (2009). The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions. Princeton University Press.
Kagel, J. H., & Richard, J.-F. (2001). Super-experienced bidders in first-price common-value auctions: Rules of thumb, nash equilibrium bidding, and the winner’s curse. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(3), 408–419.
Kamm, A., & Siegenthaler, S. (2022). Commitment timing in coalitional bargaining. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09778-3
Mitzkewitz, M., & Nagel, R. (1993). Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171–198.
Rachlin, H., Kagel, J. H., & Battalio, R. C. (1980). Substitutability in time allocation. Psychological Review, 87(4), 355.
Struwe, N., Blanco, E., & Walker, J. M. (2022). Competition among public good providers for donor rewards. Experimental Economics.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09766-7