International Organisations and States Within an Agency Relationship: The Distribution of Responsibility
Tóm tắt
This article first examines the entire range of agency relationships between an international organisation, acting as a principal, and one or more states, acting as its agent(s). It is here argued that an agency relationship between an international organisation and one or more state(s) can be established by the constitutive treaty of the organisation, or ad hoc. In particular, an ad hoc agency relationship results from a state placing one of its organs at the disposal of an international organisation and under its effective control, with the purpose of carrying out functions of that organisation. The article then examines the consequences for the responsibility of the organisation andthe relevant state(s) of an agency relationship between an international organisation acting as a principal and one or more states acting as its agent(s). It is demonstrated that an international organisation may be responsible for damage caused by the conduct of the state. Furthermore, it is argued that the state itself may bear responsibility for having established or for not having terminated the agency relationship if it commits wrongful conduct on behalf of the international organisation.
Tài liệu tham khảo
J. Crawford, Public International Law, 8th edn. (Oxford, OUP 2008) p. 120; H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blotter, International Institutional Law, 5th edn. (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) pp. 157–158.
M. Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) p. 64.
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72, ICTY, para. 36.
F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 18th edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) p. 1. See also L.J. Macgregor, The Law of Agency in Scotland (London, W. Green 2013) p. 9.
Reynolds, supra n. 4, at pp. 3, 6 and 37.
Ibid., at pp. 453–454.
A.P. Sereni, ‘Agency in International Law’, 34 AJIL (1940) p. 638 at p. 638.
ICJ, Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 August 1952, ICJ Reports (1952) p. 176 at p. 188. The Court emphasised that Morocco, the state on behalf of which international relations should be conducted, remained a sovereign state.
D. Sarooshi studied the agency relationship between a state acting as a principal and an international organisation acting as its agent. ‘Conferrals by States of Powers on International Organizations: The Case of Agency’, 74 BYIL (2003) pp. 308–332.
T. Gazzini, ‘Personality of international organizations’, in J. Klabbers and A. Wallendahl, eds., Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2011) p. 33 at p. 33.
Sereni, supra n. 7, at p. 645 and p. 648; D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford, OUP 2005) pp. 35–37.
These questions were not sufficiently addressed by academics either. Dan Sarooshi only outlines the responsibility of the international organisation and of the state when the international organisation commits a wrongful act on behalf of the state within an agency relationship established between the state being the principal and the international organisation acting as an agent. Sarooshi. supra n. 9, at pp. 329–330.
See, for instance, the immunity enjoyed by the UN by virtue of Art. 105 of the UN Charter.
For instance, Art. 9 of the UNGA Model Contribution Agreement, 9 July 1996, UN Doc. A/50/995, annex.
The legal personality of the ITC is recognised by Art. 16 para. 1 of the Sixth Agreement of the ITC.
C.T. Ebenroth, ‘Shareholders’ Liability in International Organizations — The Settlement of the International Tin Council Case’, 4 Leiden JIL (1991) p. 171 at p. 173.
P.M. Eisemann, ‘L’épilogue de la crise du Conseil international de l’étain’, 36 AFDI (1990) p. 678 at p. 678. The debts of the ITC amounted to approximately £900 million.
J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry and others, 24 June 1987, High Court (Staughton J.), 77 1LR, p. 55 at p. 55.
Maclaine Watson & Company Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, 29 July 1987, High Court (Millet J.), 80 ILR, pp. 39 et seq.
The denomination ‘International Tin Council’, or more simply ‘Council’, refers to the international organisation as well as to its deliberative organ where all member states sit.
J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry and others, supra n. 18, at p. 91.
Ibid., at p. 89.
Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry, 27 April 1988, Court of Appeal (Kerr, Nourse, Ralph Gibson L.JJ), 80 ILR, p. 49 at pp. 110–111.
A. Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council (Oxford, OUP 2011) p. 39.
For some authors, European Union Member States implementing European Union measures, without any margin of discretion, are European Union organs. See in particular P.J. Kuijper, ‘Introduction to the Symposium on Responsibility of International Organizations and of (Member) States: Attributed or Direct Responsibility or Both ?’, 7 International Organizations Law Review (2010) p. 9 at pp. 17–18.
Report of 15 March 2005, WT/DS174/R, para. 7.98, available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/174r_e.pdf, visited 6 November 2014.
Report of 29 September 2006, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS/292/R and WT/DS293/R para. 7.101, available at: www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/291r_e.htm, visited 6 November 2014.
ECtHR 30 June 2005, BosphorusHava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Antonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Appl. No. 45036/98, para. 137.
The attribution of the Regulation to the then European Community would have led to the incompetence of the Court, because the European Community was not party to the European Convention on Human Rights.
ECtHR 20 January 2009, Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 13645/05, para. 153.
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_l(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf, visited 6 November 2014.
This divergence between trade-related case law and human rights-related case law concerning attribution may be explained by a desire to attribute the disputed act to the subject that incurs responsibility for the act. Since the European Community/Union is a member of the WTO, its responsibility is engaged for any act contrary to WTO law that is attributed to it. However, since the European Union is not yet party to the European Convention on Human Rights, it will not be responsible for an act contrary to the Convention and attributed to it. This may be the reason why the European Court of Human Rights attributes European secondary legislation contrary to the Convention to States Parties.
See the description of the sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities at: www.un.org/sc/committees/1267, visited 6 November 2014.
Abousfian Abdelrazik v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada, 4 June 2009, Federal Court of Canada, no. T-727-08, paras. 3 and 44.
A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘United Nations Sanctions in Domestic Courts’, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) p. 249 at p. 256.
Abousfian Abdelrazik v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada, supra n. 34, paras. 148 and 156.
ECJ 3 September 2008, cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-06351, para. 314. This case law was confirmed by the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the following Kadi cases of 2010 and 2013.
Tzanakopoulos reaches the same conclusion: supra n. 24, at pp. 34–37.
Seventh report on responsibility of international organisations, p. 25, para. 75. legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/61/61docs.htm, visited 6 November 2014.
Seventh report on responsibility of international organisations, ibid., at p. 12, para. 31.
P. Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens (Brussels, Bruylant 1998) pp. 327–330.
See title III of the decision of the Council of the European Communities of 16 December 1969 on the progressive standardisation of agreements concerning commercial relations between Member States and third countries and on the negotiation of Community agreements, Official Journal of the European Communities 1969, L 326, pp. 41–43.
J.-P. Pietri, ‘La valeur juridique des accords liant la Communauté économique européenne’, 12 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (1976) p. 51 at pp. 70–71.
M. Zuleeg, ‘Les répartitions de compétences entre la Communauté et ses Etats membres’, in La Communauté et ses Etats membres (Liège, Faculté de droit Liège 1973) p. 23 at pp. 51–52.
Agreements organise the placing of member states’ troops at the disposal of the UN. See, for instance, the Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement between the UN and Canada Concerning the Service With the UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus of the National Contingent Provided by the Government of Canada, 21 February 1966, 155 UNTS (1966) pp. 120 et seq. A model agreement today serves as a guideline. UNGA Model Agreement between the UN and member states Contributing Personnel and Equipment to UN Peace-Keeping Operations, 23 May 1991, UN Doc. A/46/185. See also M. Bothe, ‘Peacekeeping’, in B. Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations, Vol. I, 3rd edn., (Oxford, OUP 2012) p. 1171 at pp. 1190–1191.
F. Seyersted, ‘United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems’, 37 BYIL (1961) p. 351 at pp. 406–411; D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces (London, Stevens & Sons 1964) pp. 337–343; R. Simmonds, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Military Operations in the Congo (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1968) pp. 154–155; T.D. Gill and D. Fleck, eds., The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (Oxford, OUP 2010) p. 520. See, for instance, Art. 11 of the regulation on the UN force in Congo in R.C.R. Siekmann, Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces, 2nd edn. (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) p. 96.
Seyersted, supra n. 46, at pp. 386–387; Bowett, supra n. 46, at pp. 343–346; Simmonds, supra n. 46, at pp. 156–157. See, for instance, Art. 29 of the regulation on the UN force in Congo in Siekmann, supra n. 46, at p. 100. These functions could not be exercised by the UN since it lacks jurisdictional competence. For the same reason, states participating in the forces of NATO or of the European Union also retain disciplinary power or criminal jurisdiction over them.
‘Responsibility of International Organizations’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/637/Add.1, 17 February 2011, pp. 13–14.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, 2011, p. 6 and p. 19, available at: legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf, visited 6 November 2014.
Infra, section 2.2.2.2.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 20.
In a case where an action was brought against the Austrian state for damage caused by a member of the Austrian contingent of a United Nations peace-keeping operation, the superior Court of the province of Vienna stated that what was decisive was to know ‘in whose name and on whose behalf’ the person accused of the damage was acting when the damage was committed. Oberlandesgericht Vienna 26 February 1979, 14 R 31/79, 31 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1980) at p. 312. See also, applying the rule of Art. 7 of the DARIO to peacekeeping operations: Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and others v. Belgium and others, 8 December 2010, Court of First Instance, case RG n. 04/4807/A and 07/15547/A ILDC 1964 (BE 2010) (OUP reference) Oxford Reports on International Law (online) para. 38; Dutch Supreme Court 6 September 2013, case 12/03329, ECLINL:HR:2013:BZ9228, para. 3.10.2 (Mehida Mustafić-Mujić, Damir Mustafić, and Alma Mustqfić v. the Netherlands) and Dutch Supreme Court 6 September 2013, case 12/03324, ECLINL:HR:2013:BZ9225, para. 3.10.2 (Hasan Nuhanović v. the Netherlands) (English translations available at: www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Supreme-court/Summaries-of-some-important-rulings-of-the-Supreme-Court/Pages/default.aspx, visited 6 November 2014); The Hague District Court 16 July 2014, case C/09/295247/HAZA07-2973,ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8562, para. 4.36 (English translation available at: uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLINL:RBDHA:2014:8748, visited 6 November 2014).
Agreements concluded with: Belgium, 20 February 1965, 535 UNTS (1965) p. 198; Greece, 20 January 1966, 565 UNTS (1966) p. 4; Luxembourg, 28 December 1966, 585 UNTS (1966) p. 147; Italy, 18 January 1967, 588 UNTS (1967) p. 199.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 19.
Final Report of the Berlin Conference on the Accountability of International Organisations, 2004, p. 28, available at: www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/9, visited 6 November 2014.
A. Sari, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link’, 9 International Organizations Law Review (2012) p. 77 at p. 79.
For the International Law Commission, the seconded organ still acts to a certain extent as an organ of the seconding state. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 20.
T. Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers’, 51 Harv. ILJ (2010) p. 113 at p. 148.
These ultra vires acts that are not committed under the effective control of the United Nations are attributable to the state. As will be argued infra at section 3.1.2 other ultra vires acts committed under the effective control of an international organisation by a state placed at the disposal of the organisation should be attributed to the organisation.
The possibility of a dual attribution of conduct is mentioned by the International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 14.
Mehida Mustafić-Mujić, Damir Mustafić, and Alma Mustafić v. the Netherlands, supra n. 52, paras. 3.9.4 and 3.11.2 and Hasan Nuhanović v. the Netherlands, supra n. 52, paras. 3.9.4 and 3.11.2.
Concerning the case Mehida Mustafić-Mujić, Damir Mustafić, and Alma Mustafić v. the Netherlands, see the opinion of the Advocate General Vlas, ECLINL:PHR:2013:BZ9228, paras. 5.10 and 5.11, reproduced in MLR (2013) p. 459 at pp. 473–474.
Supra n. 40, at pp. 19–26.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, at p. 43, available at: legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf, visited 6 November 2014.
Ibid.
Supra n. 55, at p. 23.
See in particular C. Dominicé, ‘La responsabilité internationale des Nations Unies’, in J.-P. Cot and A. Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies, 3rd edn. (Paris, Economica 2005) p. 141 at p. 148.
P. de Visscher, ‘Les conditions d’application des lois de la guerre aux opérations militaires des Nations Unies’, 54(I) Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (1971) p. 1 at p. 48.
‘[S]era nécessairement formé d’un faisceau de compétences et d’attributions dont les divers éléments ne devront pas nécessairement être présents dans chaque cas d’espèce mais dont l’ensemble global devra être suffisamment ferme et cohérent pour justifier une allégeance effective.’ Ibid., at p. 123.
Supra n. 49.
C. Ryngaert, ‘Apportioning Responsibility between the UN and Member States in UN Peace-Support Operations: An Inquiry into the Application of the “Effective Control” Standard after Behrami’, 45 Israeli Rev. (2012) p. 151 at p. 164.
Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and others v. Belgium and others, supra n. 52; Mehida Mustafić-Mujić, Damir Mustafić, and Alma Mustafić v. the Netherlands, supra n. 52 and Hasan Nuhanović v. the Netherlands, supra n. 52; Mothers of Srebrenica v. the Netherlands, supra n. 52, para. 4.44; ECtHR 21 July 2011, Case of Al-Jedda, Appl. No. 27021/08, para. 84.
See, for instance, P. Klein, ‘The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford, OUP 2010) p. 297 at p. 300; N. Gal-Or and C. Ryngaert, ‘From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Relevance of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) — The Responsibility of the WTO and the UN’, 13 German LJ (2012) p. 511 at p. 529; M. Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005) pp. 100–103.
Art. 8 and commentary of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, supra n. 64, at pp. 47–48.
De Visscher, supra n. 68, at p. 48.
Ryngaert, supra n. 71, at p. 154.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports (1962) p. 151 at p. 168.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999, ICJ Reports (1999) p. 62 at p. 89, para. 66.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 26. The International Law Association also stated: ‘The conduct of organs, officials, or agents of an IO shall be considered an act of that IO under international law if the organ, official, or agent was acting in its official capacity, even if that conduct exceeds the authority granted or contravenes instructions given (ultra vires).’ Final Report of the Berlin Conference on the Accountability of International Organisations, supra n. 55, at p. 28.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 26.
Tzanakopoulos, supra n. 24, at p. 32.
Hirsch, supra n. 2, at p. 77.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 6.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 90.
Supra n. 64, at p. 65.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports (2007) p. 43 at p. 217, para. 420. See also G. Nolte and H.P. Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers-Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law’, 58 ICLQ (2009) p. 1 at pp. 7–10; H.P. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (CUP, Cambridge 2012) p. 191.
Klein, supra n. 73, at p. 297. See also Zwanenburg, supra n. 73, at p. 71. For the latter, ‘the practice of international organizations does not demonstrate that a separate regime has developed in respect of international responsibility’ and, therefore, principles of state responsibility can be applied to the responsibility of international organisations.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, supra n. 64, at p. 66, para. 5.
ILC Yearbook (1978) p. 102, para. 13 (commentary on draft Art. 27).
In that sense, concerning on the one hand the responsibility of a state that acts through the organ of another state placed at its disposal in conformity with Art. 6 of the DARS and, on the other hand, the responsibility of the ‘borrowed’ state on the basis of Art. 16 of the Draft Articles: S. Talmon, ‘A Plurality of Responsible Actors’, in P. Shiner and A. Williams, eds., The Iraq War and International Law (Oxford, Hart 2008) p. 185 at pp. 218–219.
Aust, supra n. 86, at p. 250.
Sarooshi, supra n. 11, at pp. 41–42.
Art. 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, 21 March 1986, 25 ILM (1986)p. 543 at p. 572 (hereinafter: ‘Vienna Convention’).
Art. 56(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, ibid., at p. 573.
Sarooshi, supra n. 11, at p. 42, fn. 33.
Supra n. 55, at p. 28.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra n. 49, at p. 93.
This expression ‘knew or ought to have known’ is used by the European Court of Human Rights concerning the awareness of a State Party to the European Convention on Human Rights of a risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party. States Parties are indeed bound by a positive obligation to prevent a risk to life. See in particular: ECtHR 28 October 1998, Case of Osman v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 23452/94, para. 116.
Against a responsibility of states participating in peace-keeping operations for that reason: De Visscher, supra n. 68, at p. 56.
Nolte and Aust, supra n. 86, at p. 15; Talmon, supra n. 90, at p. 219.
Commentary of the International Law Commission on Art. 16 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, supra n. 64, at p. 66.
The International Law Commission stated in its commentary on Art. 16 of the DARS: ‘[W]here the assistance is a necessary element in the wrongful act in absence of which could not have occurred, the injury suffered can be concurrently attributed to the assisting and the acting State.’ Ibid., at p. 67.
Art. 47 (I) of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, ibid., at p. 124. See also Case Concerning Oil-Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports (2003) p. 161, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, paras. 75–78.
See, for instance, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) p. 31 at p. 33.
43 International Review of the Red Cross (1961) at p. 593.
However, the Court did not clarify the scope of the obligation. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports (2004) p. 136 at p. 199, para. 158.
Zwanenburg, supra n. 73, at p. 109.
Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 1968, preamble, para. 9, UN Doc. A/Conf. 32/41. Reference can also be made to following commentary of the four Geneva Conventions: J. Pictet, ed., Commentaire — IV La Convention de Genève (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross 1956) p. 21.
A majority of academics affirm that common Art. 1 of the Geneva Conventions imposes an obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for those Conventions. See Aust, supra n. 86, at p. 388; A.C. Bouuaert, ‘Responsabilité pour violations du DIH dans le cadre des opérations de l’Union européenne’, in A.-S. Millet-Devalle, ed., L’Union européenne et le droit international humanitaire (Paris, Pedone 2011) p. 119 at p. 134; M. Brehm, ‘The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’, 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2007) p 359 at p. 370; L. Condorelli and L.B. de Chazournes, ‘Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de “respecter et faire respecter” le droit international humanitaire “en toutes circonstances”’, in C. Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge (Leiden, Nijhoff 1984) p. 17 at p. 24; B. Kessler, ‘The Duty to “Ensure Respect” Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 44 GYIL (2001) p. 502; R. Kolb, et al., L’application du droit international humanitaire et des droits de l’homme aux organisations internationales (Paris, Bruylant 2005) p. 154; M. Sassoli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, 84 International Review of the Red Cross (2002) p. 401 at p. 421.
The customary international law nature of this obligation was affirmed by the ICJ in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986)p. 14 at p. 114, para. 220. However, in a later case, in emphasising that the States Parties (and not third states) to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War have an obligation to ensure respect for the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, it raises a doubt regarding the customary nature of that obligation. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra n. 106.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), supra n. 110, para. 220. See also para. 255.
Zwanenburg, supra n. 73, at p. 113.
See also Bouuaert, supra n. 109, at p. 134; Kolb, et al., supra n. 109, at p. 154 who write that states contributing to peace operations of an international organisation incur responsibility if they do not ensure that the organisation respects international humanitarian law.
For the following authors, ‘to ensure respect’ should be understood as at least requiring states not to render aid or assistance to violations of the four Geneva Conventions. Aust, supra n. 86, at p. 388; D. Schindler, ‘Die erga omnes-Wirkung des humanitären Völkerrechts’, in U. Beyerlin, M. Bothe and R. Hofmann, eds., Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewährung (Berlin, Springer 1995) p. 199 at pp. 204–205; A. Imseis, ‘Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion’, 99 AJIL (2005) p. 102 at p. 115.
A similar conclusion was adopted by authors comparing the application of Art. 16 of the DARS and of Common Art. 1 in cases in which assistance to violations of international humanitarian law is at stake. See Aust, supra n. 86, at p. 389; Brehm, supra n. 109, at pp. 385–386; Sassoli, supra n. 109, at p. 413.
See supra section 3.2.1.