Inter-store externalities and space allocation in shopping centers
Tóm tắt
This article analyzes the problem of optimal space allocation in shopping centers in the presence of inter-store externalities. In the model, a given store's sales depend on its own space as well as on the space allocated to other stores in the center. The given stores' own sales rise as other stores grow in size because the shopping center is then more attractive to customers. Taking this externality into account, the developer allocates space to the various stores to maximize the shopping center's profit, which equals total rent minus operating costs. The solution to this problem is analyzed under a number of different behavioral assumptions.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Arvan, Lanny and Jan K. Brueckner. “Efficient Contracts in Credit Markets Subject to Interest Rate Risk: An Application of Raviv's Insurance Model.”American Economic Review 76 (March 1986), 259–263.
Benjamin, John D., Boyle, Glenn W., and Sirmans, C.F. “Retail Leasing: The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents.”AREUEA Journal 18 (Fall 1990), 302–312.
Benjamin, John D., Boyle, Glenn W., and Sirmans, C.F. “Price Discrimination in Shopping Center Leases.”Journal of Urban Economics, 32 (November 1992), 299–317.
Holmstrom, Bengt. “Moral Hazard and Observability.”Bell Journal of Economics 10 (Spring 1979), 74–91.
Lee, Kangoh. “The Economics of Shopping Centers: A Literature Survey.” Unpublished paper, Office of Real Estate Research, University of Illinois, 1988.
Stahl, Konrad. “Urban Business Location.” In: Edwin S. Mills, ed.,Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, vol. 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987, pp. 760–820.