Intention-based social influence in (non)strategic sharing experiments
Journal of the Economic Science Association - Trang 1-18 - 2023
Tóm tắt
We experimentally study intention-based social influence in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games with bi-dimensional strategy vectors let individuals decide independently in the role of proposer and responder and allow fairness intentions to be role dependent. Uni-dimensional strategy vectors in modified games constrain individuals to consistent offers and acceptance thresholds. To induce social influence, we randomly match participants in groups of four, which are minimally identified by colors. Social influence is assessed by how one reacts to information about median group intention(s). The
$$2\times 2$$
factorial experimental design varies the order of the two game types and the strategy vector dimensionality. Social influence, depending on the game type and strategy dimensionality, significantly impacts participants’ behavior compared to their own intention. At the aggregate level, however, these differences cancel each other out. As there are more constraints on the action space, uni-dimensionality increases strategic concerns.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Battigalli, P., Dufwenberg, M., & Smith, A. (2019). Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games. Games and Economic Behavior, 117, 15–39.
Bock, O., Baetge, I., & Nicklisch, A. (2014). hroot: Hamburg registration and organization online tool. European Economic Review, 71, 117–120.
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review, 90(1), 166–193.
Bolton, G. E., & Zwick, R. (1995). Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 95–121.
Cason, T. N., & Mui, V.-L. (1998). Social influence in the sequential dictator game. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42(2–3), 248–265.
Charness, G., & Sutter, M. (2012). Groups make better self-interested decisions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3), 157–76.
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2016). 4. Other-regarding preferences. The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Vol. 2, pp. 217–289). Princeton University Press.
Crawford, I., & Harris, D. (2018). Social interactions and the influence of “extremists’’. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 153, 238–266.
Dahlberg, K. A. (1979). Hindsight, insight, and foresight. Beyond the Green Revolution (pp. 217–227). Springer.
Di Cagno, D., Galliera, A., Güth, W., & Panaccione, L. (2018). Intention-based sharing. Games, 9(2), 22.
Engel, C., & Singer, W. (2008). Better than conscious. In Better Than Conscious?: Decision Making, the Human Mind, and Implications for Institutions (p. 1).
Festinger, L., & Hutte, H. A. (1954). An experimental investigation of the effect of unstable interpersonal relations in a group. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49(4p1), 513.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178.
Grimm, V., & Mengel, F. (2011). Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 111(2), 113–115.
Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 108, 396–409.
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4), 367–388.
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & Walkowitz, G. (2018). Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: A systematic analysis. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(1), 301–329.
Krupka, E., & Weber, R. A. (2009). The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(3), 307–320.
Opp, K.-D. (1990). Postmaterialism, collective action, and political protest. American Journal of Political Science, 1, 212–235.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American, 223(5), 96–103.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1995). Expectations, drift, and volatility in evolutionary games. Games and Economic Behavior, 11(2), 391–412.
Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., Takagishi, H., Shinada, M., Tanida, S., & Cook, K. S. (2009). The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional commitment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(28), 11520–11523.